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Crisis, Values, and the Purpose of Science: Morgenthau in Europe  
 
Felix Rösch, Coventry University 
 
Introduction 
Shortly after finishing his Habilitation at the University of Geneva in 1934, Hans Morgenthau 
typed a lengthy manuscript entitled Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über 
die Bestimmung des Menschen (On the Purpose of Science in These Times and on Human 
Destiny). In the ever-growing literature on Morgenthau and classical realism at large, this 
manuscript has been underappreciated so far, even though it provided the foundation for a 
series of publications throughout Morgenthau’s life in which he ferociously and even 
polemically defended a normative role of science in modern societies against the backdrop 
of the rise of behavioralism.1 Most famous is certainly Morgenthau’s first book in the United 
States, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (see Hartmut Behr in this forum). Indeed, 40 years 
after Morgenthau had penned this manuscript in Geneva, he based the first part of Science: 
Servant or Master on it,2 indicating that he ‘never went much beyond, what he had basically 
said and formulated’3 during his time in Europe. 
Morgenthau wrote this piece during a time of great personal turmoil. His Habilitation was 
only deemed satisfactory by the university after a positive intervention by Hans Kelsen and 
his income dwindled as anti-Semitic German students refused to attend his lectures.4 Since 
the situation became unbearable in Geneva, he sought employment in the United States, but 
neither the Academic Assistance Council nor the Rockefeller Foundation offered help. His 
fiancée, Irma Thormann, even wrote a desperate letter to her former professor in Berlin, 
Carl Landauer. At the beginning of 1935, when Thormann wrote the letter, Landauer 
lectured at Berkeley.5 His discouraging reply reached her two months later,6 but at that time 
it seemed that Morgenthau’s fate had turned for the better. In March 1935, he was on his 
way to take up a position at the recently established Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y 
Económicos in Madrid. Shortly thereafter, however, the outbreak of the Civil War also 
vitiated this option, turning him into a ‘double exile’.7 Morgenthau’s restless life in Europe 
epitomizes the larger developments that were about to shatter the entire world. ‘The air, in 
which we dance, has changed and the ground is shaking. What used to be accepted by 
everyone turns into a matter of dispute and therefore into a matter of scholarly concern.’8 
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The rise of fascism throughout Europe was the tangible political effect of more fundamental 
metaphysical deficiencies that made Morgenthau question the role and scope of science.  
This forum contribution further unravels these two concerns of Morgenthau: the crisis of 
modern societies and the purpose of science. This takes place through a discussion of the 
core claims of Morgenthau’s manuscript by contextualizing it into European humanities and 
it is argued that these initial concerns helped him to formulate an ethics of responsibility in 
later years that still offers a contribution to today’s International Relations (IR), as it asks for 
a reflective, democratic dimension in foreign policymaking. It is also demonstrated that 
Morgenthau, like many other émigré scholars, was a “traveler between all worlds”, meaning 
that Morgenthau in America cannot be understood without having knowledge about 
Morgenthau in Europe.   
 
The Crisis of Modern Societies and the Loss of Values 
For Morgenthau, the rise of ideologies during the first half of the twentieth century was 
caused by a lack of values in modern societies. He never fully elaborated the reasons for 
their disappearance and what values he was specifically talking about, but Christoph Frei 
argues that Morgenthau envisioned values similar to the sociologist Helmuth Plessner. For 
him, these values comprised, amongst others, empathy, peace, tolerance, democracy, and 
liberty.9 However, an investigation into the reasons why Morgenthau might have refrained 
from providing an elaboration would go beyond the scope of this contribution. Therefore, it 
suffices to stress that a lack of these values endangers the political. 
At the time when Morgenthau wrote this manuscript during the mid-1930s, the 
conceptualization of the political was one of his main intellectual concerns. While at 
previous publications Morgenthau settled for relatively vague and ambiguous terms, like 
‘coloring’10 and ‘tone’11, to characterize the political, in this later manuscript he provided a 
more concise definition. He argued that the political was ‘a universal force that is inherent in 
every human and that necessarily focuses on others, while at the same time it only comes 
into being in interpersonal relationships.’12 These interpersonal relationships evolve as 
antagonistic and topical exchanges that Morgenthau termed ‘discussions’13, resulting in 
what William Galston calls ‘arena[s] of contestation’14. People express their interests and 
aim to convince others about the righteousness of their perspectives. In these non-violent 
discussions, people gain knowledge about themselves as well as about the life-worlds they 
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inhibit and shape through their actions. Realizing their individual capabilities and 
experiencing power15 through acting together, people eventually develop their identities. It 
is for this reason that, following Morgenthau, Europeans consider political actions more 
highly than philosophical contemplation.   
However, the lack of values threatens the political, as they are necessary prerequisites for 
humans to be able to act in the first place.16 In a later publication, Morgenthau explained 
this connection as follows: ‘our knowledge of what justice demands is predicated upon our 
knowledge of what the world is like and what it is for, of a hierarchy of values reflecting the 
objective order of the world.’17 Since values have disappeared in modern societies, people 
can only decide what is ‘convenient and what is not, but [they can no longer judge] between 
good and bad.’18 In other words, people lose the ability to contribute to the construction of 
their life-worlds, as the inability to judge renders them incapable of acting.  
To avoid depolitization in modern societies, values have to be reestablished. This, however, 
can only be achieved through individual contemplation.19 For Morgenthau, many people 
lacked the will and the strength to endure the solitariness of contemplation. It is this aspect 
that Morgenthau considered to be fundamental for human tragedy. Since Richard Ned 
Lebow’s study on The Tragic Vision of Politics, the tragic element in Morgenthau’s thought 
has repeatedly attracted scholarly interest, but this aspect of it has received limited interest 
so far.20 Attempting to rejuvenate human abilities to act through contemplation is for most 
humans a daunting task because they fear that through self-reflection their commonly held 
assumptions could be shattered (Erschütterung der Seele).21 This is caused by two 
interrelated developments. Since people are created in the ‘image of God’, they have a 
‘vision of perfection’22 and try to attain it. However, in the course of their quest, they realize 
that this is impossible because humans are tied to a specific time and space which is why 
they can never accumulate absolute knowledge.23 Realizing the futility of their ambitions, 
many people renounce from their quest out of fear to be incapable of bearing the vacuity of 
their existence.  
Refraining from contemplation, people imagine a reality in collectivity that soothes their 
fears, as the labor lawyer Hugo Sinzheimer acknowledged in a letter to his former clerk 
Morgenthau shortly before the Nazis gained power in Germany: ‘the political metaphysics 
and the belief in miracles, i.e. the absolute fear of reality, blurs the mind of Germans.’24 
Drawing on the work of Karl Mannheim, Morgenthau saw in this fear of facing the initial 
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emptiness the cause for the rise of ideologies in modern societies throughout Europe.25 
Unsurprisingly, recent scholarship argues that 
 
‘the main objection of the realist critiques against the liberal zeitgeist is that it is 
based on particular forms of “wishful thinking” and on (mostly pseudo-religious) 
moral and political “illusions” that systematically eclipse the actual realities of social 
and political, and also of intellectual, life.’26  
 
However, ideologies are not deliberate attempts to create an illusion of reality and to 
purposefully disorient people, but they are the product of frenzied, collective processes in 
whose course the full scope of human meaninglessness is concealed. As Morgenthau put it 
later in a further unpublished manuscript: ‘being imperfect and striving toward perfection, 
man ought not to be alone. For while the companionship of others cannot make him perfect, 
it can supplement his imperfection and give him the illusion of being perfect.’27 
 
The Purpose of Science 
For Morgenthau, there were two ways for science to deal with this lack of values and the 
subsequent depolitization in modern societies. Science could either pursue an ‘immanent’ or 
a ‘transcendent’ strategy.28 The first strategy – immanent science – is not concerned with 
these developments because values do not play a role for this kind of science. This is 
because immanent scientists only engage in empirical, policy-oriented studies that do not 
question the socio-political and cultural life-worlds they are operating in. As a consequence, 
‘science [turns] into an ideological doctrine of justification’29, as immanent science sustains 
the socio-political status quo, instead of offering a critical corrective. For Morgenthau, such 
attempts to establish a value-free science, however, were futile because science would lose 
its societal function of supporting people in their quests to make decisions and engage with 
their peers.30 The extensive criticism for behavioral sciences that Morgenthau offered in this 
manuscript anticipates his more substantial, often polemically presented concerns that he 
repeatedly voiced in the United States.31 The essence of his criticism in the United States, 
however, remained the same. Morgenthau was skeptical of behavioralism, as it focuses 
merely on empirically verifiable structures, rather than considering the human condition of 
politics. For this reason, he promoted an IR-theory that considered  
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‘the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows 
everything that can be seen by the naked eye. The painted portrait does not show 
everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows one thing that the naked 
eye cannot see: the human essence.’32 
 
The second strategy – transcendent science – was, therefore, the only viable option for 
Morgenthau. Science had to aspire to a metaphysics, but not in the sense of Mannheim’s 
world postulate (Weltwollung) – hence, a fixed, normative set of ontological assumptions – 
as for Morgenthau this would lead to attempts to reify these assumptions through social 
planning, as expounded in one of his first publications in the United States.33 Rather, science 
as metaphysics meant for Morgenthau that it had to act as ‘an interpreter of the 
imaginable’34 by making people aware of the myriad of socio-political and cultural 
constellations that submerge into their specific life-worlds at a given time. Consequently, 
this form of science asks people to be able to endure (leiden) because they not only realize 
the limits of their physical abilities to mold their life-worlds, but they also understand the 
limits of their intellect to acquire absolute knowledge. As for Morgenthau, most people seek 
ways to conceal the prospects of their imperfection, so transcendent science has to be 
prepared to be marginalized in public. As Morgenthau put it in the mid-1950s: 
 
‘[a] political science which is true to its moral commitment ought … to be an 
unpopular undertaking … it cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force 
with regard to certain vested interests – intellectual, political, economic, social in 
general. For it must sit in continuous judgment upon political man and political 
society, measuring their truth ... By doing so, it is not only an embarrassment to 
society intellectually, but it becomes also a political threat to the defenders or the 
opponents of the status quo or to both; for the social conventions about power, 
which political science cannot help subjecting to a critical – and often destructive – 
examination, are one of the main sources from which the claims to power, and hence 
power itself, derive.’35 
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However, becoming aware of the intellectual and physical limits of human existence, 
Morgenthau argued that people should not give in to them, but should engage with these 
limits, learning to accept human fallibility. This willful engagement with reality – to allude to 
Michael Williams’s term36 –   rests on Morgenthau’s reading of Mannheim’s seminal Ideology 
and Utopia, as it is in this book that he encountered the spatio-temporal conditionality of 
knowledge. This concept helped him to realize that, although absolute knowledge and 
consequently a universal objectivity are inconceivable, science does not have to concede to 
relativism. This is because objectivity is still possible, albeit tied to the specific socio-political 
and cultural constellations that inform individual perspectives.37 Embracing this form of 
objectivity as an academic standard, however, requires from its bearers (self)reflexivity and 
intellectual modesty towards other viewpoints. This means that transcendent scientists have 
to be willing to constantly review their own perspectives in the light of new knowledge 
brought about by the ever-changing constellations. This also means that intellectual 
contributions of others cannot be dismissed per se, but have to be carefully assessed and 
accepted as legitimate attempts to provide meaning to life-worlds. Through these arduous, 
long-term processes, scientists can fulfill their societal role by re-establishing values through 
which society at large regains its capacity to act.38 In other words, for Morgenthau, while 
immanent science faces the danger of providing the intellectual justification to enforce 
ideological constraints, only transcendent science can re-instill the capacity to act in people 
and the political can be reestablished and sustained.  
Evidently, in this early manuscript, Morgenthau still promotes an elitist understanding of 
science and concedes a key societal role to it, as he had learned in the study of Friedrich 
Nietzsche.39 Without science, people would be incapable of regaining their ability to act, for 
it is only scientists that have the qualities to face human meaninglessness and transcend it. 
This viewpoint only gradually changed after his emigration to the United States, causing 
recent scholarship to question Morgenthau’s ability to critically reflect upon his own 
perspective.40 Still, particularly after his relocation to New York in the late 1960s, 
Morgenthau adapted the role of science, partly because he became acquainted with Hannah 
Arendt’s democratic scholarship. Since then, Morgenthau conceded a more supportive role 
to science in the public realm. Scientists were no longer the sole guardians of the political in 
modern societies, but it takes the concerted efforts of everybody to retain responsibility for 
their own life-worlds.41 In this scenario, scientists have a supportive role, helping people to 
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formulate their interests and develop empathy towards other, potentially diverging, 
viewpoints in public discourses (see Douglas Klusmeyer in this forum). 
 
Conclusion  
Originating out of this and other unpublished intellectual exercises that Morgenthau wrote 
in Europe, it is this latter aspect of helping people to willfully take responsibility for their life-
worlds that makes his work still relevant for contemporary IR. Consequently, Morgenthau’s 
ethics of responsibility played a crucial role that brought about the revival of classical 
realism.42 
Facing current policy dilemmas, Morgenthau’s ethics asks for a shift in policymaking and 
even a reconsideration of its purpose, demonstrating that ‘what is important is not so much 
what public discourse is about as the way in which public discourse takes place.’43 
Morgenthau’s ethics does not allow drawing on ‘ontological blueprints’44 to detect social 
laws upon which the current socio-political status quo can be consolidated.45 Hence, this 
ethics criticizes policymaking that turns questions of politics into issues of administration, as 
it implies that solutions to these practical dilemmas are to be found in the establishment of 
extensive bureaucracies, rather than engaging with their contested nature.  
To avoid this development, which obstructs people from participating in policymaking 
processes and leaves it in the hands of a ‘scientific elite’46, Morgenthau’s ethics of 
responsibility encourages a ‘politics as applied ethics’47, as we find it in the writings of 
Raymond Geuss. This means that dissenting positions need to be able to be voiced during 
decision-making processes. Furthermore, their development must be actively encouraged 
and sustained in a political realm. In doing so, policymaking remains a democratic process 
that requires from politicians and the involved public to be able to face dissent and 
eventually to seek compromises.48 Policymaking is thereby removed from the hidden 
hallways of governmental bureaucracies and invites active participation from the entire 
public, which has to willfully take responsibility for their interests and actions. It also implies 
that politicians have to take responsibility, for which Morgenthau had found an early role 
model in Gustav Stresemann, the long term Weimar Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs.49 
Outcomes of policymaking processes can no longer be disguised as scientific-technological 
constraints, but are acknowledged as compromises which have arisen out of complex, 
collective negotiations. In these processes, politicians play an important role, as it is their 
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task to collate the various interests in society. Politicians also have to ponder on these 
interests and then pursue policy decisions that benefit the most. 
To achieve this ethics of responsibility, science has to be transcendent, which also means 
that it has an educational mission (Bildungsauftrag) for society at large. For Morgenthau, 
this mission cannot be fulfilled through the bureaucratization of universities, which turns 
students into consumers of academic degrees.50 Rather, this educational mission has to 
evolve as continuous support for people to seize opportunities to embrace their 
responsibilities. This means that the educational mission of science lies in contributing to 
establishing political fora that provide the space for people to engage in discussions through 
which societal change can be initiated. In this process, scientists have to be committed to 
‘“intellectual honesty” [that] seeks truth while truth is unsettling and disharmonious.’51  
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